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JPRS L/9031

15 April 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 18/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 18/80)

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPORT--RPR National Assembly deputy from Doubs [Department] and vice president of the defense committee in the National Assembly, Raymond Tourrain, will submit a report in May on "nuclear weapons in France in the year 2000." A graduate of Saint-Cyr and a former colonial official, Tourrain was in the same graduating class of the Special Military School as was General de Montaudouin, chief of the Elysee general staff, and Colonel Dabezies, who has become a law professor at the Sorbonne. He, like the general staffs, is in favor of the mobile missile and the neutron bomb. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Mar 80 p 19]

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

OPINION ON ROLE OF ITALIAN, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICIES

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 9 Feb 80 p 4

[Article by Mario Albertini: "Europe Undecided Between the Two Superpowers"]

[Text] We are pleased to publish the opinion of Mario Albertini, chairman of the European Federalist Movement, on the role of Italian and European foreign policy at present as a contribution to the discussion on the international crisis. Below is the verbatim text.

When a democratic country is in difficulty, it places its trust in a government which has national unity. This is what the FRG and Austria did recently, and they derived great benefit from it, including that of recovering a solid basis for normal rotation of parties in the government. However, in Italy it is still difficult not only to achieve a government of national unity but even to arrive at a frank negotiation among constitutional parties to determine if agreement is possible. Therefore, we must realize that, without this negotiation, it is neither possible to make public the true intentions of the parties nor to take the necessary steps to clarify the situation and stop living on a day-to-day basis.

As matters stand, there are two obstacles to overcome to arrive at the point of negotiation. One is in saying yes to negotiation but no, on the basis of prejudice, to PCI participation in government. The other is in taking foreign policy positions unacceptable to the PCI (and not only to the PCI which, moreover, in the European Parliament often holds the same position as that of the German Social Democratic Party). I should like to examine this second obstacle which is particularly insidious in that it can add to our considerable number of difficulties also that of an extremely poor foreign policy in a situation as dangerous as that with which we are faced.

My first observation concerns the fact that we shall be making a mistake if we assume well-defined positions. The basic problem is no longer, as in the past, that of strengthening the leadership of the superpower in each sphere but that of promoting a gradual evolution toward a world which

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has an autonomous role for the European Community and China and more room for an increasing number of nonaligned countries. It is a question of a new and difficult path which can be pursued only through trial and error and therefore without demonstrable certainty.

My second observation is that this evolution cannot, for obvious reasons, be promoted either by the United States or the USSR and therefore leads to a genuine discussion between the Europeans and the Americans, within the framework of the Atlantic Pact, on ways and means for passing from American leadership to equal partnership. There is a corollary. Without European initiatives, the United States would have no other possibility except that of attempting--and losing out over the long range--to strengthen its leadership.

My third observation is that American leadership (just like the Soviet) is no longer positive for Europe, the world or the United States itself, for it no longer corresponds to the establishment of evolutionary order either in the political field or in the economic monetary field. It is a process which has been underway for some time, initiated in the West in 1971 with the unilateral break in the international monetary system by the United States, and presenting precisely on this level as well as on the economic level (decisive in many aspects) a trend which has been increasingly negative. For these reasons, which moreover serve to emphasize the absence of European initiatives, the United States, like the USSR previously, is henceforth forced to lay emphasis on tests of strength, military means and rearmament.

My fourth and last observation is that it is not sufficient to fight for detente but that we must try to shift at least part of the relations of international power from a bipolar line to a multipolar line. I should like to give an example. The European Community should create a European Monetary Fund within the scope of the EMS [European Monetary System]. If this is done seriously, we shall be able to pay for oil in escudos. In this way, we would be able to replace the hegemonic relationship which exists between the dollar and the rest of the world (which is preventing the advent of a new economic order) with a multipolar relationship, balanced and adaptable to changes in the dollar-escudo-other currency relationship. It is with initiatives of this type that Europe can truly guarantee its security and effectively contribute to detente.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

IMF AIDE ON EFFORTS TO STABILIZE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS

LD010937 London THE TIMES in English 1 Apr 80 p IV (Europe Supplement) LD

[Interview with F.M. Pandolfi, president of the Interim Ministerial Committee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by Mario Salvatorelli: "First Step Towards Firm Exchange Rates"; date, place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Question] For 10 years now there has been talk--to put it mildly--of reforming the international monetary system, and we seem to be no further forward. Does this thought not discourage you?

[Answer] No, I am not discouraged. From the psychological point of view I would like to answer with a well-known adage which says, in effect, that in order to attempt something you need not be full of hope, and that success is not necessary in order to persevere. But I prefer to remain objective.

It is true that when the committee of twenty, in its final report of June 1974, outlined a progressive plan for reforming the international monetary system, not many people would have been prepared to bet on the collective ability of those involved to carry it through successfully, even given time,

I remember, incidentally, that that report recommended the IMF to examine "means of substitution". This, also, came to nothing. But since then many things have changed on the international monetary scene.

[Question] Do you mean that the situation appears more favourable to you, today? If so, on what do you base this conviction?

[Answer] The ideas and proposals of the early part of the 1970's, starting with the central idea of giving special drawing rights increasing prominence alongside the dollar, were crushed by the circumstances of which we are all aware. I refer to the great expansion in dollar credits as reserves, and the great elasticity in supply of international liquidity, the reform proposals passed into a state of eclipse, above all as a result of the first heavy rises in the cost of oil. But the size of the phenomenon, and the relative inability to control it, have slowly revived the arguments for a possible reform of the system. Thus the creation of a substitution account has clearly emerged as a first step in this direction.

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[Question] It was probably a mistake, 10 years ago, to aim too high, to imagine global reforms that the international community was not prepared to accept. Now, on the other hand, a greater degree of pragmatism seems to prevail.

[Answer] Precisely, the renewed interest in a substitution account is not, today, an abstract idea for dealing with abstract problems. The question now is how to extricate ourselves from a situation that is uncomfortable for everyone. The choice lies between a reserve system based predominantly on the dollar, and a system using a number of reserve currencies, the latter system being the product of an over-heated process that is disrupting the exchange markets. We must extricate ourselves from this situation, which is clearcut for all to see.

[Question] Would the way out of this situation be the adoption of a substitution account?

[Answer] Of the possible solutions, the substitution account offers the greatest hope of achievement. Of course, we must not cherish the illusion that with this new aid all our problems can be solved. Rather, it should be seen as a first important step forward. Especially where theoretical investigation is concerned, it would be wrong to set limits on the function of the substitution account and, more generally, the special drawing rights. But in the meantime, let us look realistically at more immediate objectives.

[Question] How would you define these immediate objectives? What I mean is, what can we and must we expect from the setting up of a substitution account?

[Answer] The biggest problem today is caused by the dollar being considered not so much as the currency of the United States but as an international currency. Foreign trade is generally settled in dollars; where payments balances are not in equilibrium, dollars tend to accumulate in one country, or in a group of countries. Those that accumulate reserves of dollars are faced with the problem of defending the value of these reserves, as time goes on: hence the tendency to convert them from time to time into currencies that are held to be more stable.

Because of the size to which the dollar surplus has risen, foreign exchange markets have come under pressure. Exchange rates have suffered as a result, fulfilling less and less their function of expressing, as should traditionally be the case, real competitive relationships between the systems of production underlying these currencies. The first objective of a substitution account is to restrict this disruptive effect on the markets.

In the meantime it is obvious that the account cannot replace the need for better coordination of economic and monetary policies, in pursuing a disinflationary strategy on a worldwide scale. The amount is complementary to this process, and is certainly not an alternative or a substitute.

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LD010959 [Question] How can the substitution account technically represent an alternative to the diversification of reserves?

[Answer] Dollar surpluses, or in any event part of the dollar reserves, can find a safe haven in the working of the account. In return for dollar deposits the central banks will receive substitution account certificates in denominations of special drawing rights, guaranteed not to lose value as time passes, with a good rate of interest and the indispensable guarantee of liquidity for balance of payments requirements. The account in turn will use the dollars received to buy longterm treasury bonds.

[Question] The account--this is, the amount of dollars deposited for substitution--must be of a sufficient size, if it is to fulfill its aim of stabilization.

[Answer] Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the substitution account depends in part on the level of deposits it will be able to collect. Imbalance in the payments balances is tending once again to become serious. One need only recall that in 1980 the petrol-producing countries surplus will certainly exceed \$10 billion, and that already at the end of 1979, the dollar currency reserves of the central banks throughout the world totalled more than \$1.2 million [as published]. The figures that I have indicated make it clear, in any event, that the account must be sufficiently large if it is to achieve its objectives.

[Question] In addition to purely currency questions would these objectives also include the better development of the world economy?

[Answer] I think so. I would like to go no farther than to emphasize this point; the oil-producing countries are now in a situation where they programme somewhat rigidly their supplies and prices, because it is not possible for them to preserve the value of the currency surpluses they obtain by exporting their oil. If these conditions change, one of the destabilizing factors of the world economic situation will be reduced. But this is only one aspect of the matter--you could quote many more.

[Question] Who will gain from the setting up of a substitution account?

[Answer] If I were to reply that we should all gain, I would be stating what I personally believe, but that might seem an answer prompted by conventional optimism. Instead, therefore, I might answer by asking a question myself: who gains from the present instability in exchange rates?

[Question] If what you say is true, the substitution account ought already to be a reality.

[Answer] One of the problems of our time, at national as well as at international level, is the inadequacy of the decision making processes, in relation to the changing nature and often the urgency of the problems that have to be faced. Patience is necessary, and tenacity.

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[Question] But it is not only a question of procedures.

[Answer] Certainly not. The setting up of the substitution account also presents other, special aspects, both technical ones and those that end up by being political in significance and colour. One need only mention problems such as the role of gold in the monetary fund as a guarantee of equilibrium between the debit and credit sides of the account. This, and other questions of more than minimum importance, are today up for discussion.

But, behind it all, the real problem stands out, which is that people generally must come to the conviction that a serious move towards reforming the international monetary system is both necessary and urgent. I said "people generally." In reality the substitution account is not the concern of just a few, nor does it affect only a few; it is the concern of a great many people, and affects a great many.

[Question] How far are we towards this general conviction? After the exploratory contacts that you have had since becoming chairman of the interim committee, what forecasts can you make?

[Answer] The contacts that I have had so far have left me with no doubt that there is a strong revival of interest in the substitution account. I think that the direct negotiations with individual countries that I have started have been appreciated. Forecasts? It is a good rule not to make forecasts, at least at this stage. On 25 April the interim committee will meet at Hamburg. It will be another step forward along a road that is not easy. I would consider it a considerable achievement if, with agreement reached on a number of essential points in the working of the substitution account, the road ahead seemed clearer, and the final destination nearer.

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FRANCE

COMMENTARY ON U.S. POST-AFGHANISTAN INITIATIVES

Carter's 'Hard-line' Policy

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 28 Jan-3 Feb 80 p 25

[Text]



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
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Effectiveness of U.S. Policy

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Jan 80 p 4

[Text]




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U.S., USSR Policies Compared

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 7-13 Jan 80 p 32

[Text]



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
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U.S. Overtures Toward PRC

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Jan 80 p 4

[Text]



China

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Moscow Olympics Boycott Effort

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 18 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]

OPERATION ANTI-J.O.




Operation Anti-Olympics (France-USA-West Germany)

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Soviet Reaction to Boycott

Paris LE FIGARO in French 28 Jan 80 p 1


[Text]



Effectiveness of Boycott Proposal

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Jan 80 p 9

[Text]



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Political Overtones of Boycott

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 25 Jan 80 p 11

[Text]




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Overreaction to Afghanistan Events

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Jan 80 p 3


[Text]



Soviet Interventionist Policy

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Jan 80 p 3

[Text]



"You'll see, it gets tiring after awhile..."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

COMMENTARY ON MARCHAIS' PRO-SOVIET PCF POLICY REALINEMENT

Marchais' Moscow Visit

Paris LE FIGARO in French 12 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]



"Nothing to declare?"

"But yes! The usual--The USSR is always right!"


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Marchais-Brezhnev Moscow Talks

Paris LE MONDE in French 10 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]



"I go back with you?"

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Brezhnev Exerts Influence

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]



"I only want to see one head."


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Marchais Toes Soviet Line

Paris LE MONDE in French 13-14 Jan 80 p 2


[Text]



'His Master's Voice'

Paris LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE in French 13 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]



Red Army chorus


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Soviet Mouthpiece

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 14-20 Jan 80 p 20

[Text]



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Official Soviet Line Verbatim

Paris LE FIGARO in French 4 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]



"Hey, that piece on Kabul, you got it?"

"Hold on a second! I'm still translating!"


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Puppet of Soviet Regime

Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Jan 80 p 1

[Text]



"I'm looking at the subtitles."


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Reversal of Czechoslovak Policy

Paris L'UNITE in French 11 Jan 80 p 4

[Text]



Czechoslovakia (bad); Afghanistan (good)


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PCF Alone in Support

Paris L'UNITE in French 18-24 Jan 80 p 2

[Text]




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Reaction of Party Militants

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Jan 80 p 4

[Text]




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PCF Membership Policy Defections

Paris L'UNITE in French 25-31 Jan 80 p 3

[Text]



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Weakening of Communist Party

Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Jan 80 p 12

[Text]



French Communist Party


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Marchais' Presidential Ambitions

Paris L'UNITE in French 11-17 Jan 80 p 3

[Text]



"Hey, taxi! Elysee, if you please!"

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FORMER COMMUNISTS DETAIL REASONS FOR DEFECTION FROM PCF

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 16 Feb 80 pp 72-75

[Article by Michel Labro and Jacques Roure: "The 'Ex' PCF Members"]

[Text] Ambassador or chairman-of-the-board, professor at the College de France, or hospital head: All of them are former communists. L'EXPRESS questioned these refractory characters whose youth idol was Stalin.

A French ambassador posted today in a big capital city, the president of a powerful real estate bank, the chairman-of-the-board of a big insurance company, a College de France professor, a hospital head, or a high official: What do they have in common? They are all former communists.

The leading party in France is neither the Socialist Party, the RPR [Movement for the Republic] or the PCF [French Communist Party]: It is the party of the "ex-members," of communists who have been either expelled or have dropped out in the course of the proletarian adventure.

Several years ago, an investigation on the political past of some high administrative officials might have made a French McCarthy dizzy.¹ The management of the Quai d'Orsay Economic and Financial Affairs, the Agricultural Markets Direction and Control Foundation, budget estimates, foreign economic relations of the Ministry of Finance, and the National Statistical Institute was controlled by former communists.

In the 200 Families. . . .

1950: Brilliant young men met every week at the bar on the seventh floor of L'HUMANITE, Rue du Louvre, where the offices of LE FIGARO are presently located. Finance inspectors, diplomats, or recent graduates of the National Administration School, they had come to the party

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through the Resistance. Some of them had come from unexpected places. "We had estimated the number of children of great families within our ranks: 189 from Daladier's famous 200 families," says Jean Pronteau, a former member and, today, one of Mitterrand's advisers. These well-born "eggheads" were involved in the work of the PCF Commission on Economics.

Today most of them refuse to discuss that period. "Youthful prank," is their most frequent answer. "I shall not meet with you, I have broken with this period of the past," aggressively answered a former administrator of L'HUMANITE, today directing a daily of the Hersant group.

One of them agreed to talk provided he remain anonymous. Who would have thought that this chairman-of-the-board, gray-haired, drinking old Armagnac, had been a party member over a period of several years, after the war? "In a radical time I had to make a radical choice. Not everyone was 18 at the time of Munich." He was to suffer the consequences: As a young graduate of the ENA [National Administration School], appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he spent years copying marriage certificates of French citizens living abroad. He held onto his beliefs until the day that he decided to break with the party, quietly. Thorez's theories on the pauperization of the workers, while we were experiencing a period of extensive economic growth, plus the Budapest situation, had destroyed his faith.

Tens of thousands of communists at all levels are leaving the party every year. They do so quietly. They may have joined in the feeling of enthusiasm of a strike, a celebration, or a struggle. They retained their membership for a while. They leave for personal reasons or because the life of a member seems too demanding. The PCF drops every year between 50,000 to 70,000 members.

This represents slightly over 10 percent of the official membership. The experts describe the PCF as a "sieve party." The purpose of the forceful recruitment campaigns is to fill those losses before even thinking of expanding the membership.

"The Renegades Are Always Alone"

The PCF has become adjusted to this turnover. Many of its former members are in its voting constituency. However, the departure of some of them has been dramatic.

Charles Tillon, 83, wearing a gray gaberdine jacket and a velvet cap, living in a small home for the elderly in his native Brittany, was one of the most prestigious communist leaders. Before the party was born, in 1919, he rose the crew of his ship on the Black Sea, to prevent it from acting against the Soviet Republic. In the Resistance, he commanded the Francs-Tireurs and the partisans. After the liberation he was General de Gaulle's minister of aviation. Yet, on 19 September 1952,

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regardless of his past history, he was charged with treason. He was asked to disavow his actions. He was forced to resign as mayor of Aubervilliers. He was lucky not to be considered a "cop" or separated from his wife within the party, as was the case with his friend Andre Marty, who had been "tried" at the same time.

The party makes those who leave feel guilty. "I am leaving," proclaimed Edgar Morin to Claude Roy, in 1950. "But the party is our lifeline," Roy answered, dismayed. He himself was to leave in 1958.

Again in 1950, Pierre Daix, nicknamed "the watchdog," wrote in LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE that, "Renegades are always alone, liars and desperate." He broke with the party in 1974. In 1961 Laurent Casanova, who had been in charge of the intellectuals starting with the liberation, went down. "Now you will be sinking deeper and deeper," he was told by Jeannette Vermeersch.

"They Would Switch Sidewalks"

This is a feeling shared by many of these fellow travelers. Claude Roy remembers it. In 1956 he met Jean-Paul Sartre in Delphi, in Greece. Sartre severely criticized the PCF. Yet, the same evening the philosopher called the writer to his hotel: "Roy, do not leave the party. It is not very pretty but it is the only one we have." Sartre does not remember giving this advice. Yet, this is a good illustration of the existence of two very distinct categories: unregistered sympathizers and registered nonsympathizers!

Unquestionably, this is the reason for the slowness of some breaks. It is not easy to become a "renegade," a "traitor to the working class," or a "petit bourgeois returning to his background." "I did not want to tear up my card," emphasizes a member in Marseilles. "I kept on paying dues but was no longer a member. Seeing me, comrades would change sidewalks." "I feared someone would say, so, you are no longer a revolutionary," says Edgar Morin.

Even though disgusted, some remained within the party. After May 1968 and the Prague winter, many of those leaving were to say, "Actually, the whole thing came to an end in 1956."

Pierre Daix, a friend of Picasso, and of Aragon, became a communist in 1940. As early as 1956, following the Soviet intervention in Hungary, he began to question himself. However, he began to express his doubts publicly only following the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, and it was only five years later, in 1973, that he broke with the party. The trigger was Solzhenitsyn. The dissident, whose friend he became, was sent into exile. The heading in L'HUMANITE was "Solzhenitsyn vacationing in Switzerland." This was too much.

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Why did Daix bear for such a long time the burden of his silence? He was hoping to change the party from the inside. "This is the eternal ambiguity of the internal opposition," says Claude Roy. "One nurtures the illusion of remaining a whole potato in the party's mashed potatoes maker."

Having crossed the threshold, does it become easier to get rid of such thinking mechanisms? Here is the initial reaction of journalist Dominique Desanti, who had barely left the PCF, when Pierre Lazareff asked her to work for his newspaper: "One does not answer to Lazareff or to the corrupt press." She felt equally guilty after meeting again a vaguely Trotskyite friend: "To see myself there, publicly sitting down together with an enemy of the party!"

Today, Jean Lerede, former worker at the Editions du Parti, and since recently an ex-member, admits that, "Until quite recently I had forbidden myself to read Celine." There are places where one does not go, newspapers to which one does not contribute, hands one does not shake, or books one does not read.

Conversely, the former members will have a great deal of trouble, later on, to believe that they too had participated in the commission of the "crimes" they condemn. Jean Chaintron, one of the two communist prefects during the liberation, says: "I was very thick-skinned." Edgar Morin: "I exonerated the executioners." Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie: "I was a Stalinist, a true fascist." Yet, how many among them go on thinking that as long as they were in the party everything was legitimate.

"The Bald Ukrainian"

Roger Garaudy, former member of the Political Bureau, lives surrounded by books and reproductions of statues, brought here from all over the world, in a cottage made of millstone, on the bank of the Marne River, in Chennevières. Today he feels quite remote from the party. In October 1979 he came across Marchais who asked after his health. "Thank you, it is better than your politics." Garaudy does not regret in the least his Stalinist past. He believes that the party went wrong as of 1968, i.e., at the time when he began to rebel and not before.

Garaudy condemns the intervention in Czechoslovakia but continues to justify the 1956 intervention in Hungary: "There was the danger of fascism." This is the classical justification of the Stalinists and a common feature of the former communists: The experiences of some rarely benefit others.

Not all of them leave for the same reasons. Between 1956 and 1958--the first major wave of postwar breaks--the impulse was triggered by the Khrushchev speech and the Hungarian intervention. By denouncing the atrocities committed by Stalinism, says Edgar Morin, 'Mr K., the bald

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Ukrainian, was exposing the truth." Those who left at that time, therefore, left, above all, because of the USSR. For many of them everything crumbled once the socialist fatherland lost its aura.

A different context prevailed in the case of the second wave, from 1968 to 1970. The intervention of Soviet tanks used to suppress a more liberal socialism in Czechoslovakia, naturally, played an essential role. However, disagreements as to the party line in France were also taken into consideration: Garaudy left both because of Prague and the party's attitude toward the May 1968 movement.

"This Kind of Millstone. . . ."

In 1980, even though the most recent departure, that of theater director Antoine Vitez occurred after the Russian intervention in Afghanistan, the chances that the Kabul coup will produce the same results are slim, so low has the prestige of the Soviet Union sunk. Last year, following the publication of "reprimands" against the USSR, a group of young members said: "We do not need this millstone." It is no longer the big Soviet brother who is forcing the former members to cross the red curtain in the opposite direction, but the PCF itself.

Novelist Jean Thibaudeau became a member in 1970. He dropped his membership because of the "normalizing of the debate," following the last legislative elections. "Within my cell, there was real discussion. The next day, not a trace of it could be found in L'HUMANITE. Today Thibaudeau reads LIBERATION. He speaks affectionately of people he has known in the PCF, such as Gilbert Prigano, boss of the Club Mediterranee. However, Thibaudeau no longer contemplates any kind of involvement. His reaction is shared by many former communists. The party has exhausted their stock of militancy.

Where do those who have not been cured of politics go? "Elementary," the party answers. "They go to the right. Look at the unfortunate Doriot." This is false: The majority of former members continue to think left.

Marcel Prenant, 87, with a degree in the natural sciences was a model member until the day the Soviets decreed the existence of bourgeois science and proletarian science. He was in Poland when he was told that, "You will have quite a job back home. Something new has happened in the Soviet Union: Lyssenko has proved that genetics was a bourgeois invention." "I immediately realized that Lyssenko was a charlatan." It took him eight more years before he resigned. To this day, the old man considers himself a communist. He even finds a way to defend Stalin. The infidels, the culprits, are the others: Thorez, Marchais, the "opportunists," and the "electoralists". . . .

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Such is also the reasoning of Alain Krivine's young Trotskyites who left the party in the mid-1960's. They are more revolutionary than ever. It is the party which no longer is.

Like the USSR, the party has lost its mystical halo. In 1980, former members did not hesitate to speak to the PCF from the outside. One of them is Guy Konopnicki, 31, who was one of the leaders of the Communist Students: "Garaudy's expulsion," says he, "is the latest case in which the expelled pleads guilty, at least through his attitude. I, today, write for LIBERATION or LE MATIN and reach 100 times more communists than by attending my cell meetings."

A certain number of former members apply in their craft qualities developed in the course of their membership: ability to analyze, and a sense of organization, hierarchy, discipline, and disinterestedness. "These people are frequently self-taught, active and dynamic," says historian Philippe Robrieux. A former section secretary, for example, holds an important position in the commercial office of an airline. Journalist Jean-Francois Kahn acknowledges that the party gave him a taste for thrift. Le Roy Ladurie, the historian, gained in the party a view of social groups. It influenced his research method and has given him a tremendous lesson in skepticism: "Going through the party resembles somewhat the initiation rites demanded by the savage tribes of their members. I have lost my innocence. I had made a bet as to the future and I lost it. I have been vaccinated against the totalitarian temptation. I am a liberal because liberalism excludes all fanaticism."

"Flowers for the Mummy"

"The former members are people who can no longer be taken," emphasizes Alain Besancon, author of a treatise on Sovietology, aimed at recalling certain basic truths regarding the communist world. "There are certain gestures we would not make," he goes on to say, "such as placing flowers at the foot of Lenin's mummy, as Giscard did." "Or else be surprised, as was Carter at the beginning of the Afghan affair, discovering that Brezhnev had lied to him," adds Michel Crouzet, another former member and professor of literature in Amiens. "What did he think? That Brezhnev was a good old boy?"

Jean Gager, one of the leaders of the Paris Federation, published a letter complaining of the "authoritarian" methods used by the leadership within his federation. A commentary was presented by Elleinstein on Radio Europe 1, on 23 December 1979. The press was touched. The people of LIBERATION were smirking, the newspaper being crowded with former communists. How can one be surprised by the party methods, they say, particularly when, like Gager, one has long practiced the same methods?

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The temptation among the former members is to become privileged--and almost institutionalized--critics of the party and the communist world, even though Kahn believes that "having gone through the party does not enable one to know more about what is happening in Kabul or Teheran, or else that nothing entitles a former communist idiot to become a former intelligent communist." The former members have a "flair," a "view," a "sensus communismi," say Alain Besancon, to explain whatever circles around the communist world.

"The Blonde Walkyrie"

Annie Kriegel, one of the best specialists in the PCF, is feared for her sharp analyses. A professor and a FIGARO editorial writer, every morning she reads very closely L'HUMANITE. "Should I come across Marchais," says she, "I would have nothing to teach him. However, nor would he have anything to teach me. Actually, I was his teacher at the Ecole Federale." When she was a party member, "of the faith," from 1942 to 1956, Annie Kriegel was a Stalinist. Edgar Morin, whom she expelled, describes her as a "blond Walkyrie, looking icy and innocent." Leaving the party, she did not publish a single line for eight years. That was the time needed to restore a coherent way of thinking.

In the autumn of 1974, during the honeymoon between the PCF and the Socialist Party, she gave a series of lectures in American universities, together with political expert Georges Lavau. "Lavau," says she, "was impressed by the Union of the Left. I was not. But, he asked, what is it that lets you react this way? I answered: 'Nothing. I feel it deep within me.'" Shortly afterwards, on 15 October, Roland Leroy was to deliver a vitriolic speech attacking Francois Mitterrand. This was the first big hitch.

The former communists will always show a tendency to become Cassandra's. They will tend to answer, like Solzhenitsyn, who, when asked, "To what camp do you belong?" answered, "The concentration camp." This is a paradox of the party: Producing former members of the party, it is producing people who, strengthened by their experience, will turn against it.

The old mole of history, dear to Marx, does not always dig in the same direction.

FOOTNOTES

1. At the beginning of the 1950's Senator Joseph McCarthy had launched a witch hunt against American citizens suspected of harboring communist sympathies.

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2. Jacques Doriot was one of the PCF leaders before becoming the leader of the PPF, an extreme-right party, and then the leader of the armed cooperation with the occupation force.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER DENIAU INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 15 Feb 80 p 68

[Interview with Jean-Francois Deniau, minister of foreign trade, conducted by Florence Portes: "Tell Us . . . Jean-Francois Deniau"]

[Text] [Question] What would be the consequences to French foreign trade should we return to the cold war?

[Answer] Extremely bad. Generally speaking, neither confrontation nor worry are good for the development of international trade, which we need to meet our energy bill, as well as to maintain or increase domestic employment. On the other hand, our relations with the Eastern countries account for a substantial share of our foreign trade (even though not exceeding three to five percent), affecting very specific sectors of French activity, heavy equipment in particular. For example, we have recently signed a contract with the GDR for several million railroad cars. This represents many hours of work and large numbers of jobs for an area such as Valenciennes.

[Question] A number of commentators are insinuating that the fact that France has not aligned itself with the United States in demanding a boycott of the USSR, its position did not exclude commercial considerations.

[Answer] To know that commercial relations exist and acknowledge that they are important to us, and try not to destroy them lightly, seems to me to bespeak of simple good common sense and to be the normal function of the minister of foreign trade. . . . This said, I, personally, believe that trade should yield to other considerations, such as respect for human dignity, national independence, the right of the peoples to self-determination and respect for our alliances and obligations. The commentators you mention are wrong should they believe that French policy is inspired by mercantile considerations. The real question is the following: In the current circumstances, following the invasion of Afghanistan, could it be that the greatest danger is escalation of confrontations and return to the uncontrolled development of the cold war? Should the main objective not be to safeguard the peace? Who better than us could play this moderating and responsible role?

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[Question] Are you not in favor of an economic boycott of the USSR?

[Answer] I do not greatly believe in economic boycotts. Historically, this has never worked well and it merely exacerbates nationalism. This yields the opposite of expected results. Let us be neither weak nor naive.

[Question] Assuming that the Olympic Games are not held, what would be the consequences for the French companies which have made heavy investments?

[Answer] They would be limited. The contracts are not huge. What has been ordered has been largely delivered and already paid for. What remains consists mostly of minor operations.

[Question] French industries have a good position. They would be able to benefit from a cooling off of relations between the United States and the USSR?

[Answer] This must not happen. I am not in favor of the cold war, but I am in favor of solidarity with our allies. Even though I may not agree with all the aspects of their attitude, we must not profit from their decisions to take their place. These are deals which, in fact, never pay in the long term. Conversely, let us think of preserving our legitimate interests.

[Question] Should French companies show such inclinations, would you block them?

[Answer] My rule is simple: if a contract had been concluded benefiting one of our partners and, subsequently, annulled, we should not try to substitute for him. Should there be open competition, let the best man win. . . .

[Question] What is the status of our trade relations with Iran?

[Answer] Our trade with Iran amounts to about 40 percent of what it was before the "events." The matter of the American hostages is intolerable, that is clear, and we must express our solidarity with them. Yet we must also think of preserving our relations with that country.

[Question] Would a new devaluation of the yen threaten our foreign trade balance?

[Answer] I have long wished that a more satisfactory monetary system be established on a global scale, putting certain limits the current disorder (as we have accomplished on the European level and which has worked, all skeptics notwithstanding). The yen has been quoted very low for some time. Yet in 1979 we set a record in our successful international bids, occasionally against Japanese companies. In my view, however, its rate of exchange is too low.

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[Question] How do you see the situation in 1980?

[Answer] It will be difficult but nothing is already lost. There is no reason to despair. On the contrary, we have all the necessary reasons for action.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

LABOR UNION LEADERS BEGIN MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 13 Feb 80 p 10

[Article by E. P.: "Meeting Between Union and PCI Deals Mainly With Red Brigades and Emergency Situation"]

[Text] Rome--It was to be a meeting devoted exclusively to economic topics, but the assassination of Professor Bachelet at the University of Rome broadened the discussion between the representatives of the PCI and the delegation of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and UIL [Italian Labor Union] unions led by secretaries Lama, Carniti and Benvenuto.

On Botteghe Oscure Street, where the PCI has its headquarters, Berlinguer, the head of the Chiaromonte economic office, and group leaders Di Giulio and Perna spoke with the union leaders for several hours, the first item on the agenda in the meeting which the CGIL, CISL and UIL requested of the principal political forces. Today there is to be a meeting with members of the Socialist Party and on 21 February with those of nonpartisan groups. A meeting has not yet been scheduled with the Christian Democratic Party, as the conference of 15 February will take the most important people out of circulation for a few days.

It is known that, after the general strike of last month, the union plans to press the government on the following subjects: the tax controversy, an increase in family allowances and pensions. Moreover, the union continues to be concerned about the government's disinterest in the South in general and in Calabria in particular: Gioia Tauro is a project which still needs to be completed.

The PCI representatives pointed out the difficulties of the situation, rendered still more dangerous by increased terrorism. However, it is noted in union circles that Berlinguer also appeared to be concerned with the deterioration of the economic situation.

The initiative of the unions in requesting this series of meetings at the political level could contribute to a clarification of the discussion which will arise shortly after the Christian Democratic congress. In fact, the

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interlocutor is currently represented by the parties more than by the government on which criticism is being heaped more and more each day even by the forces which support it. Moreover, up to now the dialog between Cossiga on the one hand and Lama, Carniti and Benvenuto on the other has yielded meager results and, even today, the positions which emerged in the latest "heated" meeting in Palazzo Chigi are rather far apart.

The union wants a clear-cut general policy to include sectoral lines which would aid in rescuing, even at a productive level, the industrial groups which are the hardest hit and where the threat of unemployment is imminent. But up to now, the dialog on this score has fallen on deaf ears, and, with the new series of meetings, the union is trying to prod the parties into stirring up the waters and compelling the government to engage in a more incisive fight against inflation.

According to Agostino Marianetti, deputy secretary general of CGIL, the Unitarian Federation has maintained "that the economic emergency, the democratic emergency and the international emergency suggest a political aboutface by a more representative and authoritative government." Marianetti also asserted that the unions are against "bungling solutions."

At the conclusion of the meeting between the unions and the PCI, Giorgio Benvenuto, UIL secretary general, defined the meeting as being "worthwhile." The union leader stated that the delegation of the CGIL, CISL and UIL federation told the PCI that there is need for a political aboutface. Confederal Secretary Della Croce added that the union has not suggested any specific political formula.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the PCI press office issued a communique in which it condemned recent terrorist acts such as that carried out against Prof Vittorio Bachelet.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

LOCAL OPPOSITION TO MILITARY USE OF LAND IN SARDINIA

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Mar 80 p 15

[Article by Gino Zasso: "Sardinian Town Opposed to Military Base."]

[Text] Cabras (Oristano)--In 1976 there had almost been a popular revolt: the whole town (8,000 inhabitants, mostly farmers and fishermen) descended as one on the town square to protest the turnover for military use of the Sinis peninsula, a picturesque promontory for tourism north of the Gulf of Oristano. Then, the Second Air Region was going to expropriate 200 hectares of land to install, so the official version went, a radar station for military use. The local population, the communal administration at its head, feared that the establishment of another military base in a single province [the first being at] Oristano, already burdened by a military presence, would be a mortal blow to an economy which, based primarily on fishing and agriculture, had sought new venues through tourism.

There already exists, on the other side of the gulf, a live fire range at Capo Frasca which occupies an area of 5,000 hectares but which extends, during maneuvers, over at least 30,000 hectares between lagoons, solid terrain and coastline: radar stations, heliports and supply bases of Torre Grande, Marina Di Oristano are already in place; there's the Monte Arci NATO base, also set up over the protests of Ales and Morgongiori, the two centers most burdened by the presence of the military base. For this reason, no one at all wanted this new imposition at Cabras, and initially it appeared as though the popular protest may have attained its desired effect.

However, 4 years later, suddenly the commune was notified of the decision, without appeal, from the General Headquarters of the Air Force: over 13 hectares of land in the zone of San Salvatore had been hurriedly turned over. The occupation, in fact, will occur on 20 March and for that day the commune has been asked to nominate a representative to officiate at the turnover. The same decision was handed down to dozens of citizens who own tracts bordering communal land parcels.

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The number of hectares taken over were not 200 as was initially decided, but significantly less. Nevertheless, the reaction at Cabras was immediate; urgent meeting of the communal council (minority Christian Democratic [DC] rule, with Italian Communist Party [PCI] and Italian Socialist Party [PSI] in the opposition, all present), and a unanimous decree passed against the installation of a new base; to this was added the solidarity of many communes in the province coupled with the threat of massive protests against military bases.

"Land taken away from the commune was for grazing but that taken away from private owners is used for vineyards and olive trees" said Cesare Carta, age 35, a geometrician with ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] at Oristano and DC mayor of Cabras. "What bothers us most, however, is the fact that the base will be in the heart of Sinis, among the ponds of Cabras and Mistras, between San Giovanni and Is Aruttas, a marvelous untouched zone for which a plan for tourism development had already been approved by the Region."

The mayor has decided to fight, but he is also dispirited: "Against decisions that come from above, there is little we can do," he said. "So much for the respect for local autonomy and for the 'uniqueness' of the Sardinian regional status. Nevertheless we will leave no stone unturned."

And the attempt to counter a new imposition on Sardinia will take place not only at Cabras but in all the towns of Sinis. ("We are not at all certain that this involves a radar station" said the mayor. "Maybe beneath it all there is something much graver.") The regional parties' secretariats are taking up the matter and popular assemblies are being held almost everywhere while the first petitions begin to land on governmental desks.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

SOVIETS USING CANARY ISLANDS AS INTELLIGENCE BASE

LD020711 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Mar 80 pp 45-48 LD

[Unattributed report: "The Spies' Paradise"]

[Text] Nearly 200 Soviet ships and thousands of Soviet citizens visited the Canary Islands in January. The Russians are seeking something more than trade in the islands. The archipelago is today the most important Soviet intelligence base in the whole of northwest Africa and since last August has been the principal supply center for Cuban troops going to Ethiopia. From the Canary Islands the Soviets are seeking to counter the influence wielded by the Americans in the "second Mediterranean" from the bases of Rota, Kenitra, Lajes and Lisbon.

A year ago the "Zarya", an old and insignificant sailing ship purchased by the Soviet Union from the Finns and fitted out as an oceanographic vessel, was discovered 29 March 1979 by the Azores authorities in a place close to their coasts with its electromagnetic sounders and ground and air radar systems operating.

When asked what they were doing in a place so close to the coast and, of course, inside Portuguese territorial waters, the crew of the "Zarya" replied that they had discovered Atlantis and had irrefutable proof that the legendary continent extolled by Aristotle and Plato existed.

In order to give their reply greater credibility an officer of the ship and member of the Moscow Academy of Sciences promised to publish some photographs of the Atlanteans' city, which was "submerged very close to the Azores," according to the Soviets.

Monitoring "Second Mediterranean"

A year later, the Azores authorities are still waiting for the photographs to be published. Quite hopelessly, of course, because the "Zarya's" real "scientific" mission was not to discover Atlantis but to gather as much information as possible about the air and naval installations which the United States possesses at Lajes (Azores).

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Since then Soviet "scientific" vessels have continued to visit the ports of the Azores and the Canary Islands with excessively noticeable frequency. The "Kurentsov", with 32 crewmen and 23 scientists, reached port in the province of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 26 February 1980. A few days later, the former freezer vessel "Polyanoe Siyaniye", now transformed into a scientific vessel and allocated to the Moscow Academy of Sciences, which controls most of the Soviet research vessels, berthed at the same quays. The USSR oceanographic vessel "Ernst Krenkel" also did so 1 March.

The research vessel "Khronomert" visited the ports of the Canary archipelago in early March, and the "Kosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin" and "Kogostrov", the freighter transformed into a scientific vessel--both of which are apparently connected with the USSR's space program and equipped with the most sophisticated satellite communications and spacecraft tracking systems--are expected at the end of the month.

According to military sources in several European countries consulted by CAMBIO 16, the almost constant presence of Soviet scientific vessels in the triangle formed by Rota, the Azores and the Canary Islands forms part of the Soviet Union's plan for monitoring the "second Mediterranean"--that island sea formed by the western coasts of the Iberian peninsula, Morocco, Gibraltar and the archipelagoes of the Canary Islands, the Azores and the island of Madeira.

"By monitoring this 'second Mediterranean,'" the above-mentioned sources told this magazine, "the USSR not only has a physical presence and effective intelligence about what is happening in northwest Africa but also completely monitors the traffic of oil and raw materials being transported to Europe via Capetown or through the Mediterranean--the only two possible routes for all merchant ships and tankers coming from Africa, the Persian Gulf and Asia.

Canary Islands, Favorite Target

The Canary archipelago is currently the favorite target in the Rota-Canary Islands-Azores triangle of the Soviet "fishing boats" and "scientific" ships for conducting their monitoring of the Atlantic, the western Mediterranean and North Africa.

Out of the 208 nonfishing vessels of the USSR and allied countries which put in at Spanish ports in January 1980, 108 visited the ports of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in the Canary Islands. In addition 95 other fishing boats registered in east bloc countries, mainly Soviet, called at the two principal Canary Islands ports during the same period.

This massive presence of Soviet vessels in the Canary Islands is mainly due to the obstacles to conducting their military intelligence activities which they find in other ports. "In the Azores," a Spanish military source told CAMBIO 16, "they are viewed with suspicion because the U.S. base at Lajes is there, and they do not have very many opportunities in Algeciras, either, because Rota is next door."

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What are problems elsewhere are opportunities in the Canary Islands. "The Soviets," Senate Defense Committee Chairman Alberto Ballarin Marcial commented, "have won over much of public opinion in the islands through the POLISARIO and Algeria. The USSR seamen walk about in the islands and nobody is suspicious of them, whereas a recent visit by the U.S. ambassador was received with placards against it reading 'Yankee bases out.'"

LD020713 The paradoxical thing is that--according to Spanish military sources--there are no military bases, even Spanish bases, in the Canary archipelago.

On the other hand, 1 out of every 10 Soviet fishing boats and most of the USSR's scientific vessels are conducting intelligence activities, according to information given to this magazine by reliable sources.

These activities mainly involve detecting the presence of U.S. and western submarines and warships in the Atlantic and transmitting this information to the USSR's spy satellites. Thus the Warsaw pact's military authorities have enemy war units constantly located and could destroy them in a Blitzkrieg in the event of a nuclear war.

Very Scientific Vessels

But that is not everything. Soviet fishing boats and "scientific" vessels have to draw up maps and plans of all the areas which they visit and which could constitute safe refuges for their submarines and warships, even though they are in "enemy territory."

In the case of the Canary Islands, the volcanic orography of the islands and their continental shelves would be a safe place for hiding any nuclear submarine. "We would not be surprised," a Spanish military authority stated, "if they had bathymetric plans of all the islands, since on one occasion a civil pilot informed us of the presence of non-Western submarines moving away from the islands semisubmerged."

It would not be the first time that a Soviet submarine has concealed itself on Spanish territory. The Cartagena naval authorities recently informed a group of experts on military matters that Ibiza is frequently used as a base by a USSR nuclear submarine "on which we keep a constant watch."

Of course, if the submarines cannot be monitored, the Soviet scientific vessels can. At least 16 of these visit the Canary archipelago fairly frequently on basically military missions, aimed at countering the U.S. and NATO presence in the Azores, Lisbon, Kenitra (Morocco), Rota and North Africa.

These vessels are the "Akademik Kurolev," "Akademik Kuchatov," "Professor Zorbov," "Professor Vize," "Musson," "Passat," "Petr Lebedev," "Sergey Vavilov," "Yakov Garkkel," "Kegostrov," "Morzhoveti," "Nevel," "Zarya," "Kosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin," "Kosmonaut Vladimir Komarov" and "Ernst Krenkel."

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Almost all of them are equipped with a nuclear protection system which would enable them to carry out missions in areas contaminated by nuclear explosions. All hatches are watertight and equipped with an electronic closing system operated from the bridge.

Both facilities, characteristic only of military vessels, in themselves indicate the "scientific" nature of the Soviet vessels supposedly dedicated to exploration of the seas' natural resources. The presence of air radar systems, sophisticated aeri--some of them for contacting the satellites--and the complicated triangulation systems on some of these vessels, such as the "Ernst Krenkel" and others in the akademik class, demonstrate, according to sources in the western secret services, that what the Soviet "oceanographic" vessels are least interested in is goldfish.

25,000 Soviets!

The constant stopovers by Soviet "fishing boats" and "oceanographic" vessels in the Canary Islands cause the presence of citizens of the Soviet Union in Tenerife and Gran Canaria to be felt daily.

Those who feel this presence most are the Indian storekeepers living in the archipelago, who quite frequently have to replenish their stocks of umbrellas and nylon stockings "made in Japan," as a result of the Russian fishermen's massive purchases.

The Spanish police also watch their movements closely, but, according to the Canary Islands authorities, "not as much as would be desired because of lack of resources."

And the fact is that there are currently 25,000 citizens of the Soviet Union in the area of the Canary Islands and the Saharan fishing bank, according to what Senate Defense Committee Chairman Alberto Ballerin Marcial told CAMBIO 16, adding that his sources were "very reliable."

Moreover, it is very difficult to watch a contingent of people of this nature, however great your resources, especially since the crews of the Soviet fishing boats in the islands are periodically replaced. "In this situation," a policeman told this magazine, "it is even understandable that most of the Soviet personnel visiting the islands should feel at home."

Two Soviet fishermen left the Canary Islands under improper circumstances 25 October 1979. They were Vasilii Nebogatov and Aleksandr Ivanov, crewmen of the Russian fishing boat "Apsheon," based in the Canary Islands. Both were on the files of the Spanish border police as having returned to the Soviet Union 29 May. They had stayed in the islands with no record of their presence until 25 October.

Several months earlier, the Gran Canaria authorities had noted similar "anomalies" in the case of Soviet citizen Anatoliy Yanchukov. Yanchukov

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disembarked in Las Palmas 23 May 1979 to leave for Moscow by air the same day. He did not catch the plane. His whereabouts since then, are unknown.

Palevy Kordaly and Leonid Preslaru are in the same position. Both of them--Soviet fishermen in the islands--should have left the country 14 August 1979. However, it is not known where they are.

On the other hand Vanentin Yasinkiy and Aleksandr Beyrodney, both of whom are crewmen of the Soviet fishing boat "Melitotol," were found to be in the islands without the knowledge of the Spanish authorities. When the police arrested and questioned them, both Yasinkiy and Beyrodney had spent several months in Las Palmas and had no entry stamps on their passports.

As a result of these "anomalies" the civil governor of Las Palmas imposed a fine of 250,000 pesetas on Sovhispan--the Spanish-Soviet joint enterprise which had arranged the Russian fishermen's arrivals in and departures from the islands.

Strange Tourists

However, lack of supervision is an everyday matter in the Canary Island ports. The Soviet liner "Leonid Sobinov," 21,639 tons and 185 meters in length, called at the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife at 0900, 29 February 1980.

The manifest which the ship's captain handed over to the port authorities stated that 1200 Cuban farmers, bound for the port of Adden [as published] in Ethiopia, were on board the Russian liner.

But nobody could see the passengers. During the 12 hours that the "Leonid Sobinov" stayed in the port--the time required to fill the diesel and water tanks and to load 5 tons of British potatoes and 2 tons of cabbage--the 1200 Cubans remained confined in the cabins, although CAMBIO 16 has been able to establish that none of them was over 25 years old and that almost all of them had crew cuts, like the U.S. marines.

However, this was not the first time that the "Leonid Sobinov" had called at Canary Island ports carrying Cuban relief troops bound for the Horn of Africa. The Russian liner took on board supplies of food and fuel in Tenerife 14 December 1979, carrying on board 396 crewmen and 896 Cubans bound for the port of Adden.

The same ship was seen again in Tenerife 10 January, returning to Cuba, this time with 389 crewmen and 969 Cubans, who were returning to their country after staying a year in Ethiopia. On this occasion the "Leonid Sobinov's" passengers showed themselves on the decks of the ship, and the usual passers-by on the quay were able to see that some of them had an arm or leg in plaster.

The Russian liner "Leonid Sobinov" called again at Tenerife 25 days later, 4 February, this time en route from Cuba to Adden, with 800 Cubans and 387 Ethiopians, who had received military training in the "pearl of the Caribbean." As in the case of all the journeys out to Africa, none of the "passengers" showed themselves on deck.

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Unheeded

As a result of this situation, the U.S. embassy in Madrid has given the Spanish Government two warnings. In both of them the U.S. authorities expressed their concern at the fact that the Canary Island ports were becoming the supply center for the 26,000 troops which the Cuban regime has sent to fight in the Horn of Africa, and whom it replaces every year with younger and better trained troops.

In the opinion of U.S. strategists, the Canary archipelago has become the principal supply center used by the Cuban troops sent to Africa, following the fall of [former equatorial Guinean president] Masie 3 August 1979 and the closure of the Soviet base at Luba. According to the same source, this quite simply means that the Canary archipelago is in this respect currently clearly and blatantly serving the Soviet Union's military interests in Africa.

Both warnings have apparently gone unheeded by the Spanish authorities. The Foreign Ministry's diplomatic information office told CAMBIO 16 that "there is no record of them," and that it cannot be proven that the Cubans sent to Ethiopia are troops.

"The manifests given to the Spanish authorities," this magazine was told, "state that they are 'tourists' or 'farmers,' and in light of this we can do nothing, because the ships behave normally in the ports, and we do not know whether or not the Cubans and Ethiopians are traveling armed."

In the meantime, two further Russian liners with Cuban troops have availed themselves of the Canary Islands authorities' kindness to call at the islands and take on board supplies of fuel, water and food. The "Fedor Shalyapin" called at Puerto de la Luz in Las Palmas at 0730, 11 March, with 717 Castroist troops returning to their country. The "Shota Rustaveli," also flying the Soviet flag, had done likewise 12 January, with another contingent of 746 Ethiopian and Cuban troops.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWITZERLAND

PILATUS PC-7 TURBO TRAINER SALES NOTED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 1 Mar 80 p 14


[Text] The PC-7 "Turbo Trainer" military training aircraft built by Pilatus is confirming its entry into the international market with a large number of aircraft already sold as of today. Since it was first marketed in December 1978, 50 aircraft have been delivered, some 100 are still to be delivered, and options have been taken for some 100 others.

Let us recall that the PC-7, designed by Pilatus for Swiss Air Force needs, was certified in the spring of 1978. Equipped with a Pratt and Whitney PT6-A A25 turboprop engine, its performance and its tandem two-seater configuration make it an aircraft that can be used for all phases of military student pilot training, from basic training to preparation for piloting a modern combat aircraft. According to its manufacturer, it thus makes possible a sizable reduction in the number of hours set aside in the training schedule and a substantial economy over the use of light single- and twin-engined training jet aircraft. Currently its rate of production in the Stans plants is four to five aircraft per month; that rate is expected to reach six units during the year 1981.

The PC-7 is now in service in 7 air forces in the world, and following evaluations of the aircraft that were made by the Swiss, German, Austrian and French air forces, the U.S. Air Force asked Pilatus to show the PC-7 to the Air Training Command in Texas and to the Pentagon Headquarters in Washington.

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In front of the Pilatus plants, at Stans, four PC-7 Turbo Trainers are ready to be delivered to the Bolivian Air Force.

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